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Copyright in software
KANWALPURI

Recent developments in the law in some overseas countries and in the computer
and related industries have focused increasing attention on copyright as a vehicle for
protection of proprietary rights in software. These include, for example:
(i) The "untieing" of software/hardware
packaged computer programs.

packages and the emergence of

(ii) The mass marketing of and demand for software brought on by the
personal computer in home, school, university ("courseware") and smallbusiness computers.
(Ui) The tremendous success of the video game industry.
(iv)

Changes effected by the Australian Copyright Amendment Act, 1984, the
United Kingdom's Copyright (Computer Software) Amendment Act,. 1985,
the United States' Software Copyright Act, 1980, and the judicial
confirmation of copyrightability of computer programs in some other
countries, e.g., Canada: Apple Computer fnc v Macintosh Computers fnc.l

The Copyright Act, 1962 (NZ) does not expressly enumerate computer programs
as copyrightable subject-matter. No consideration was given to the special needs of
the computer industry when this statute was passed, no doubt because the computer
industry was still in its relative infancy. It is therefore, not possible to discern clearly
whether the legislature intended to include computer programs within the scope of
copyrightable subject-matter in the Act of 1962. Today, computer software is
extremely important, yet there is no clear law on its protection. In New Zealand, the
Industrial Property Advisory Committee (IPAC) has recommended that the
Copyright Act, 1962be amended to confirm protection of computer programs.2 Since
it is unknown whether and when IPAC's recommendations will be implemented by
the legislature this paper will consider the state and effect of the present law in New
Zealand. For this purpose some knowledge of copyright system is required. Also, a
description of the operation of a computer sufficient to provide the background to a
determination of the issues seems desirable.3
.
1.
2.
3.

(1986) 28 DLR 178.
See The Legal Protection ill New Zealand for Computer Programs (Preliminary R~port 10 March,
1984 and Final Report 18 March, 1986) Department of Justice, New 7..ealand.
See below the appendix to this paper, Glossary of Computer Jargon ...
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A copyright is automatically born the instant thoughts and ideas are transferred
from an author's mind to paper or some other material form. There is absolutely
nothing to be done in order to have a legally enforceable copyright. Protection by
copyright is automatic, immediate and free from formalities. The protection is not
perpetual, however. The general rule is that copyright subsists for the life of the
author plus 50 years. At the expiration of this period, the work falls into the public
domain. The Copyright Act, 1962 confers copyright protection on eight general
categories of copyrightable creations, viz., literary, dramatic, musical, artistic, sound
recordings, cinematograph films, broadcasts and published editions. Once entitlement
to protection under one of these categories is satisfied, the copyright owner has
certain exclusive rights in regard to that particular work. The exclusive rights include
the right to reproduce the work in any material form and the right to re-create the
work in a different version (adaptation). In a broad sense, the copyright law is
designed to safeguard the copyright owner against unauthorised making b}(.others of
reproductions that might otherwise have been sold by the legitimate own,r
What exactly is copyrightable? Copyright law protects the expression of ideas,
not the ideas themselves. The ideas must be in some retrievable form, for example, in
handwriting or print, or recorded on magnetic tape. In addition, the Act requires that
the creation be original. But copyright requires only a minimal degree of originality to
qualify for protection. Almost anything is considered original so long as it is not
copied. The expression "original" does not mean that the work must be the expression
of original or inventive thought. "The originality which is required relates to the
expression of the thought. But the Act does not require that the expression must be in
an original or novel form, but that the work must not be copied from another work that it should originate from the author".4 Originality is a matter of degree, depending
on the amount of skill, judgment or labour that has been involved in making the
work.s
There is an important limitation placed on copyright. It is subject to the right of
all persons into whose possession the work comes, to deal fairly with it. The concept
of fair dealing permits the reproduction, for legitimate purposes, of material taken
from a copyright work to a limited extent t~at will not cut into copyright owner's
potential market. Thus sections 19 and 20 of the Copyright Act, 1962 limit copyright
own~r's rights where the use of the work is made for purposes of research or private
study. Use of the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the owner's
consent may also be made for purposes of criticism, review, reporting of current
events or reporting of judicial proceedings. The doctrine of fair dealing attempts to
balance the rights of the copyright owner against the interests of society. So in an
,appropriate situation, the copyright owner's interest in a maximum financial return
may be subordinated to the greater public interest in the development of education,
research and industry.
Besides sections 19 and 20, which permit limited copying for specified purposes
by private individuals for their personal or private study, section 21 contains special
4.
5.

Universityof London PressLtd. v UniversityTutorial Press Ltd (1916) 2 Ch 601, 608-609.
Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd (1964) 1 WLR 273, 277-278.
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exceptions for libraries, universities and schools. Thus, copies of l;terary or other
works may be made or supplied by or on behalf of a teacher or a librarian at these
institutions. Section 21(1) lists four conditions which must be fulfliled to make an
otherwise illegitimate copying permissible:
(i) the copies may be supplied only to persons who satisfy the teacher or
librarian that they require them for research and private study;
(ii) no copy is to extend to more than a reasonable proportion of the work
in question;
(iii) no person is to be given more than one copy of the same piece of work; and
(iv)

no payment apart from the actual cost is to be taken for supplying the
copies.

Another important exception to infringement is to be found in section 21(4). Under
this provision, the copyright in a literary or other work is not infringed by reason only
that the work is copied, or an adaptation thereof is made either (i) in the course of
instruction at a university or school or elsewhere by a teacher or student; or (ii) as
part of a question to be answered in an examination or in answer to such a question.
The first part of this exception appears to be very broad as it does not seem to place
any limit on the amount of the work or adaptation which may be copied or, indeed, on
the number which may be made.
Before discussing copyright protection in software in detail it is necessary to
consider briefly the nature of software. "Software" can have various meanings. This
paper equates it principally with computer programs. A computer program is a set of
instructions designed to cause a computer to perform a particular function or to
produce a particular result. The instructions may be written in any of three different
levels of computer languages. Computers can "understand" (i.e. execute) only
programs in "machine language" - the lowest level. A machine language instruction is
a cluster of "0" and "1"symbols called "bits", which are the only symbols recognised
by digital computers. A piece of software consisting of a sequence of machine
language is described as an "object code". To make it easier for humans to read and
write programs, two "higher" levels of languages exist - "assembly language" and
"human-readable language". Assembly language instructions consist of alphanumeric
labels rather than bits (e.g., HLT = "halt processing"). To be executed by computer,
the alphanumeric instructions must be translated into their corresponding clusters of
bits by another computer program known as an "assembler". Human-readable
language, such as FORTRAN or COBOL, that employs English-like words is easier
to use and understand than assembly or machine language. A computer program
known as a "compiler" translates human-readable language into the corresponding
object code. Programs written in assembly or human-readable languages are referred
to as "source programs" or "source code".
To be used in a computer, object code must be stored in a memory device such
as a floppy disk or a "read-only memory" (ROM). A ROM consists of a
semiconductor "chip" (integrated circuit), about the size of a small fingernail, enclosed
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in an outer package that is plugged into the circuit boards of the computer. B'ecause
ROMs are- easy to unplug, they are readily inserted into a laborator)' gevice that can
copy the object code ,into another ROM or on to paper. The "output"-of a computer
may be in various forr~s, for example, a paper printout, a visual display Qn a monitor,
or the control of other/machinery.
There has so far been no decision of the New Zealand courts relating to the
subsistence of copyright in computer software, though in an interlocutory proceeding
the Auckland High Court seems to have recognised that computer programs are
susceptible to copyright protection: IBM v Computer Imports Ltd.6 It is worth noting
that the Federal Court of Canada has recently held that under Canadian Copyright
Act, 1970 (similar in many respects to the New Zealand Copyright Act, 1%2)
computer software is entitled to copyright protection and this decision may well be of
persuasive value in New Zealand courts: Apple Computer Inc v Macintosh Computers
Inc.? In the United Kingdom provisional opinion has been expressed by judges in
interlocutory proceedings that a machine code program (object code) is either a
reproduction or an adaptation of an assembly code program.s The Supreme Court of
South Africa has also held that a program in an object code may be a literary work.9
Given that the United States, United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, Japan,
Netherlands, West Germany, South Africa and India have all confirmed (either
,through legislative amendment or judicial pronouncement) that software is entitled to
protection under the copyright law, it seems safe to assume that the courts in New
Zealand would also be prepared to hold that copyright subsists in software.
Is a source program entitled to protection under the Copyright Act, 1962? It may
be recalled that the written program in source code is directed to a human reader and
not to a machine. Its essential function is to record and communicate programming
instructions. Is it an original literary work? In interpreting the expression "original
literary work" the following principles have been established:
(i) In order to satisfy that description the work must afford either information
and instruction or pleasure in the form of literary enjoyment to human '
beings.1o
'
(ii) A literary work includes "any written table or compilation".ll
(iii) There is no necessity for a literary work to have any literary merit or
quality.12

6:
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

12.

The Dominion Wellington, 211uly, 1986,p 21.
(1986) 28 DLR 178.
Sega Enterprises Ltd v Richards, (1983) FSR 73. See also Thrustcode Ltd v W W Compitting Ltd
(1983) FSR 502.
Northern Office Micro Computers Pty Ltd v Rosenstein (1982) FSR 124.
Exxon Corporation v Exxon Insurance Ltd (1982) Ch 119;Hollinrake v Trnswell (1984) 3 Ch 420, 428.
Section 2(1), Copyright Act, 1962 (NZ). See also at 608 where Peterson, 1, said, "In my view the
words 'literary work' cover work which is expressed in print or writing, irrespective of the question
whether the quality or style is high". This observation was approved by House of Lords in Ladbroke
(Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Ltd (1964) 1 WLR 273, 285, 291.
Robinson v Sands & McDougall Pty Ltd (1916) 22 CLR 124, 133..
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It is sufficient if the work supplies information capable of conveying an
intelligent meaning, even if only to a limited group with special knowledge.
It is immaterial that this. information is not expressed in the form of words,
. -.
13
P hrases or seIitences:"

(v) '~Originality" means that the author's own skill and labour must be involved,
though the degree of stich skill and labour may be slight. It is not necessary
that new or inventive ideas be contributed by the author, but work must be
more than a copy of other material.I4
It is submitted that source program dearly satisfies these tests. IS Whether or not
a literary program must be in writing, a source prpgram is in writing. Although the
substance of the program may be expressed in assembly code, this is a language which
i{ readily intelligible to anyone versed in computer science. Each program is the
product of skill, time and effort. It is a particular kind of vehicle for the
communication of useful information to persons who may desire it. Before the source
program is transformed into another medium (viz object program), it has an existence
wNch is entirely independent of the machine. It is capable of conveying meaning as to
1'tte arrangement and OI:dering of instructions for the storage and reproduction of
knowledge. These features of a source program are sufficient to bring it within the
scope of literary copyright. However the conclusion that copyright subsists in source
program may not have great practical significance because software is distributed only
in oBject form. The underlying source code is retained by the software producer and is
not publicly available. This is common practice because the user needs object
13. ThuS'a telegraphic code has been held to be a literary work though the words of the code were
. - meaningless: D P Anderson & Co Lid v Lieber Code Co (1917) 2 KB 469.
14.
Pitman v Hines (1884) 1 TLR 39; University of London Press Ltd v University Tutorial Press Lid
(1916) 2 Ch 601, 608-609; Ladbroke (Football) Ltd v William Hill (Football) Lid (1964) 1 WLR 273,
277-278.
15. In the court of first instance in Apple Computer Inc & Another v Computer Edge Pty & Another
(1984) 1 IPR 353, Beaumont, J, held that copyright did not subsist because a source code was not
literalY work. TIle judge argued that a literary work is something which was intended to afford
"either information or instruction or pleasure in the form of literary enjoyment". He found support
in a statement appearing in Hollinrake v Tn/srwell (1894) 3 Ch 420 by Davey, U, [recently approved
in E¥Xon Corporation v E¥Xon Insurance Consulta/lts I/ltel1lational Lid (1982) Ch 119 (CA)]. Except
Deane, J, all other judges (four High Court and three Full Federal Court) held that a source
program is protectable because it is an original literary work. Deane, J, considered this unnecessary
to decide (see the High Court's judgment reported in (1986) 6 IPR 1 and Full Federal Court's in
(1984) 2 IPR 1); Hollinrake was a case in which a cardboard sleeve chart, i.e., a representation of a
sleeve designed for a lady's arm with certain scales of measurements on it intended for practical use
in dressmaking, was held not to be a literary work. Davey, U, said at 428: "a literary work is .
intended to afford either information and instnlction, or pleasure, in the form of literary
enjoyment". In Exxon, the English Court of appeal denied the character 'of a literary work to the
single work "Exxon" standing alone: "It is a word which though invented and therefore original, has
no meaning and suggests nothing in itself'. It is submitted that writings in the form of mnemonics
of alphanumeric code are included within the definition of compilation. Several authorities may be
cited in support, e.g. Pitman v Hines (1984) 1 TLR 39 (Ch D) (shorthand notations), Ladbroke
(Football) Lid v William Hill (Football) Lid (1964) 1 WLR 273 (HL) (football betting coupons),
University of London Press Lid v University Tutorial Press Ltd (1916) 2 Ch 601 (examination papers).
It is submitted that the statement made in Hollinrake was not, nor was it intended to be, exhaustive.
But even if that statement were applicable, the source programs did convev information and
instruction.
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program for execution on a computer and may not have a compiler or assembler to
convert
from of
source
to object
form.!Moreover,
software
producers
restrictfrom
the
dissemination
the source
code to
shi¢ld the structure
and logic
of the software
disclosure to competitors and potential competitors.
As stated above, most software is now sold in a more basic form called "object
code" that is directly intelligible to the machine. Some people have attempted to
circumvent the copyright protection of source programs.:by copying only the object
code version of the program and maintaining that. obi4ct code is not covered by
copyright law. Opponents of copyrighting object code ground their objections both on
the language of the statute and on the differences between the policies underlying
copyright law and those underlying the patent law. Some would deny copyright to
object code on the basis of these arguments:
(i) The copyright statute protects only works intended to communicate to
humans. Because the use of object code in machine-usable form conveys
nothing of the programmer's original expression to the user, but instead
merely controls the computer, the opponents conclude that object code
could not qualify for copyright protection. Gibbs, CJ, summed up this
argument in a succinct manner:
"It seems to me a complete distortion of meaning to describe electrical
impulses in a silicon chip, which cannot be perceived by the senses and
are not intended to convey any message to a human being and which
do not represent words, letters, figures or symbols as a literary work;
still less can a pattern of circuits be so described".16
16.

Compllter Edge Pry Lcd vApple Computer Illc (1986) 6 IPR 1,9 (hereinafter referred to as the Apple
case). In May, 1986, the High Court of Australia in a split decision (3:2) held that copyright did not
subsist in software. In all, nine judges were involved from the trial to the highest appellate court:
five of them held that copyright protections did not extend to computer programs in object code.
The proceedings arose out of the importation into and sale in Australia by Computer Edge (a
Victorian Co) of micro-computers under the name "Wombat". Apple Computer Inc (a Californian
Co) filed civil action against Computer Edge seeking injunctions, damages and an account of profits
under the Trade Practices Act, 1974 and the Copyright Act, 1968. Apple, Manufacturer and seller of
micro-computers under the name of "Apple n", claimed that to the knowledge of Computer Edge
(formerly an Apple dealer) the Taiwanese manufacturer of "Womba." had copied Apple's softwalje.
Apple alleged that three silicon chips (2 ROMS and 1 EPROM) installed in the Wombat were
unauthorised copies of Apple's six ROMS installed in Apple II microprocessor. Apple claimed
ownership of copyright (i) in the "Applesoft" source and "Autostart" source as original literary
works; and (ii) "Applesoft" ROM (in machine or object code) and "Autostart" ROM (in machine or
object code) as original literary works. The second claim to ownership was supplemented by stating
two alternative grounds of ownership: (0) Apple's ROMs (Le. object programs in the silicon chips)
. were adaptations or translations of the source programs; or (b) Apple's ROMs constituted a
reproduction in a material form of the Applesoft and Autostart source programs. The main issue
was whether copyright subsisted in software. This involved a difficult problem of construction of the
Copyright Act, 1968, Beaumont, J, held that neither the Applesoft source nor the object program
was an original literary work. On appeal, the Full Court of the Federal Court held by a majority .
(Fox and Lockhart, JJ, Sheppard, J, dissenting) that Apple ROMs were translations or adaptations
of the source code programs and that Wombat.. ROMS and EPROM were unauthorised
reproductions. The Full Court was unanimous in holding that source code programs were protecied
by copyright. On further appeal to the High Court, the majority (consisting of Gibbs, CJ, and
Brennan and Deane, JJ,) in restoring Beaumont, J's, decision, held that Apple's ROMs (object
code) were not protected by copyright. Further, the ROMs were not translations 0,( lldapt.ati9ns of
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(ii)

Copyright of the source program cannot automatically protect the object
code version because the latter is not an "adaptation" of the former in the
sense the word "adaptation" is used in the Act. Furthermore, an adaptation
of a literary work should itself qualify as a literary work, but an objecc
program is not a "work".

(iii)

The notion of reproduction within the meaning of the Copyright Act
requires that the infringing work must sufficiently resemble the copyright
work. In other words, no infringement would occur if the reproduction does
not have a visible similarity to the work reproduced. That is, when the
authorities say that there should be "a sufficient degree of objective
similarity between the two works",17 this signifies a similarity of the physical
manifestations of the work, not simply the works embodied therein. This
viewwas adopted by the High Court in the Apple case.

(iv)

Finally, many potential objections to copyrighting object prggram stem
from the concern that copyright protection would undermine the purpose
of the patent scheme by granting the functional equivalent of the more
extensive patent monopoly to a work that has not been examined under the
high standards of patent law. These arguments can rest uppn any of three
views of the nature of object code: that it is a "machine part", an
embodiment of a useful "art", or a "process", all of which are subject-matter
of iJa-tent law.

It is submitted that object code both is and should be protected by copyright law.
It is further submitted that the current Cop}'Iiight Act, 1962 does provide protection to
object form software. Several arguments against copyright protection of object code
will be examined in the following paragraphs to show that they are unpersuasive. It is
further submitt~d that the protection of object code is consonant with the purposes of
the copyright scheme and well suited to the characteristic needs of the software
market.
It is submitted that the existing New Zealand Act is largely sufficient in providing
copyright protection to all forms of computer programs though some amendments
may be made for the purposes of clarification and removal of doubts. The Intellectual
Property Advisory Committee has made recommendations to the same effect.18 While
rejecting the suggestion of patent protection for computer software, the Committee
has recommended that urgent action be taken to amend the Act of 1962 to cOllfinn
that it does cover computer programs: "That the Copyright Act, 1962 should be
amended to apply in relation to a computer program as it applies in relation to a
literary work and that it should be a retrospective amendment... since it is intended as

17.
1£

the source code programs. Deane, J, went further to hold that Apple's ROMs were not
reproductions in a material form of the written expression of the programs expressed in source
code
See Francis Day & Hunter Ltd v Bran (1963) Ch 587, 614; Lend Lease Homes Pry Ltd v Wa"igal
Homes Pry Ltd (1970) 3 NSWR 265, 273; S W Hart & Co. Ltd v Edwards Hot Water Systems (1985)
59 AlJR 729, 730.
See The Legal Protection in New Zea!and for Computer Programs (Preliminary Report 10 March,
1984 and Pinal Report 18 March, 1986) Department of Justice, New:Zealand.
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a confi1711atioll of existing rights 19. It is arguable, however, that in the light of the
Australian High Court's recent judgment of 6 May, 1986 in Apple case, the above
italicised statement may lack validity. In other words, the Apple ruling may be said to
represent the state of the law in New Zealand prior to the 1984 Australian
amendment. It is submitted that that is not the correct inference.
In Computer Edge Pty Ltd v Apple Computer Inc20, Apple claimed that Computer
Edge's importation of a "Wombat" computer was an infringement of its copyright in
two computer programs, known respectively as "Applesoft" and "Autostart". Computer
Edge did not deny piracy but contended that Apple's object programs (embodied in
ROMs) were not protected by copyright because they were inter alia not literary
works. At first instance Apple failed to persuade Beaumont, J, that its object
programs were protected by copyright under the Copyright Act, 1968 (Australia). The
judge held that neither the object programs nor the source programs from which they
were derived w,ere original literary works capable of copyright protection. Subsequent
to the decision, the Copyright Amendment Act, 1984 was passed which conferred
copyright protection on computer software. But since the amendment did not apply
retrospectively, the judge's decision remained intact. However, on appeal, the Full
Bench of the Federal Court overturned Beaumont, 1's, decision by a majority (Fox
and Lockhart,. JJ, Sheppard, .I, dissenting) and held that the object programs
contained in Wombat ROMs and EPROM (erasable program able read only memory)
were reproductions of the programs contained in the Apple ROMs, which were
themselves adaptations (i.e. translations of their respective source code programs).
The Full Court was unanimous in concluding that the source code programs were new
and original literary works in which copyright subsisted, but divided on the adaptation
issue. On further appeal, the majority of the High Court (Gibbs, CJ, Brennan and
Deane, JJ, Mason and Wilson, JJ, dissenting) held that, under the Copyright Act, 1%8
(prior to its amendment in 1984 specifically to deal with computer programs),
copyright protection did not extend to computer programs in object code. The High
Court did not distinguish the position of machine readable object code in ROM or in
disk or tape nor did it make any distinction between operating system software and
application software (nor, for that matter, data in any machine readable medium).
The source programs, which were written by human hand on paper, were held by the
majority of the Court (Deane, J, not expressing his opinion on this matter) to be
literary works and therefore protected under copyright law. In short, the Australian
High Court's majority found as follows:
(i) To enjoy protection, Apple's object programs should qualify as literary
works themselves, or translations (i.e. adaptations) of the source code, or
reproductions of the source code in another material form.
(ii) Object programs, either as electrical impulses or fixed in a permanent state
in ROM, did not constitute literary works and were not subject of copyright
protection.
19.
20.

Emphasis supplied. Ibid Final Report, p. 16..
(1986) 6 IPR 1..[The High Court of Australia reversed Full Federal Court's deCision reported in
(1984) 2 IPR 1 and restored Beaumont 1's decision repolted in (1983) 1 IPR 353]. For a detailed

statementof facts,see abovenote 16.
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(iii) An object program was not a translation (i.e. adaptation) of the source
code.

(iv) A reproduction

must have a visible similarity to the work reproduced.

It is submitted that the Australian High Court's decision would not be followed
in New Zealand. Firstly, that decision does not have any precedent value even in
Australia because of the enactment of the Copyright Amendment Act, 1984 which has
extended copyright protection to all forms of computer software to the same extent as
it applies to literary works. Secondly, the majority's reasoning on some points, it is
respectfully submitted, is not unimpeachable
(e.g. in relation to the nature of
"reproduction"). It is also arguable that the decision ran contrary to the Australian
Copyright Act. Thirdly, there are some material differences between the wordings of
the Australian Copyright Act, 1968 (pre-amendment)
and that of the New Zealand
Copyright Act, 1962, which are likely to sway New Zealand courts in favour of
copyright protection to object programs.
The High Court's (majority's) main objection to giving copyright protection to
the object programs was that they were not literary works. Their findings on this point
may be summarised below:
(i) Object programs existed in the form of sequences of electrical impulses, or
possibly in the pattern of circuits that when activated generated those
electrical impulses.
(ii) They were not expressed in writing or print. Section 22(1) of the Copyright
Act, 196821 should be read with section 10(1)22 to construct "writing".
Material form still requires writing. Moreover, ROMs were not within the
definition of "work" as stated in section 10(1).23
(iii) They were not visible or otherwise perceptible, and were not intended to be~
capable by themselves of conveying a meaning which could be understood
by human beings. The fact that the object programs might have been
printed out in binary or hexadecimal form was not relevant.
(iv)

A material form is a form which can be perceived by the senses. But a form
which is not perceptible to sight, touch or hearing is not a material form.
The electrical charges which constitute the object programs cannot be seen
or touched or heard or, if they can, they do not communicate the letters of
the original literary work, the source program.

There are several problems with these findings. First, there is the objection
regarding lack of accessibility. The copyright law's tradition has been to protect works
produced in written text. In the present writer's view, the requirement of "readability"
or "appearance to the eye" or "visibility" requires no more than that there be a method
by which the work in which copyright is claimed and the work which is alleged to

21.
Equivalent to section 3(8). Copyright Act, 1962 (NZ).
22.
EquivAlent to section 2(1), Copyright Act, 1962 (NZ).
23. r TIle expression "work" is not defined in the New Zealand copyright legislation.
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infringe can be visually compared for the. purpose of determining whether copying has
occurrea. Since, in this case, the programs could be "read" out of ROM and so
compared, this requirement is met. Further, the definition of "literary work" is not
exhaustive. It may well take account of modern means of communication al1d of
recording information, which have moved so much (and so rapidly) into the electronic
field.
Second, there is the problem of medium-message dichotomy. A programmer
writing a program is not thinking about the specifications of the ROM chip voltage
levels, or logic gates, or conditioning the circuitry of the CPU, or of providing
specifications to the manufacturer of the ROM chip for the construction of that chip.
Indeed, the medium in which the program eventually finds itself (disk or chip) is not
of concern to him or her. The programmer is thinking of the wmputer as having a
certain number of registers and of being able to perform a certain number of limited
uperations and of moving information between those locations.
The third problem relates to perceptibility-visibility question.
The majority
relied heavily on the point that an object program could not be perceived by the
senses and was not visible. This requirement was said to be found in the delinition of
expressions like "writing" and "work" in the Act. The inspiration for this requirement
comes from an oft-cited (though obiter) remark of Holmes, J, of the Supreme Court
of United States in a 1908 case called White-Smith MiiSic Publishing Co v. Appollo.24
The learned judge had said:
"The ground of this extraordinary right [meaning copyright] is that the person
to whom it is given has invented some new collocation of visible or audible
points,-of lines, colors, sounds, or words."
The case was decided under the Act of 1897 (based on the UK Act of 1842). The
judge was concerned about tangibility; the purpose was to exclude ideas or mental
conceptions. The judge wanted to ensure that the subject-matter should be durably
perceptible - should be something concrete so that it may be possible to trace
ownership. It is submitted that in that sense, a ROM chip is tangible, is durably
perceptible and there is no difficulty regarding tracing the true owner.
The Apple majority conducted the case on the footing that a ROM embodied a
series of electrical impulses stored in the chip. The judges should have perhaps
conducted it on the footing that obje<,t program contained written description in binary
or hexadecimal notation. But even if they are to be treated as electrical impul1>es,those
impulses serve to identify a set of instructions which originated from written description .
. Fourth, there was the question of writing requirement.
The majority's
fundamental objection to giving copyright protection to object programs was that they
were not in writing. This conclusion was supported by the definition of "literary work"
which includes "a written table or compilation".2S Must a literary work be in writing?
24.

(1907) 209 US 1

25.

Emphasis

supplied.

instead of "a".

Note that the New Zealand

anal('glle

in .ection

2(1) contains

the word "any"
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Ordinarily and traditionally it is true that a literary work would take a written form.
But the Act docs not require it to be so. Indeed, section 22(1)20 identifies the time
when the work "was first reduced to writing or some other material fomz".27 There
seems no reason to doubt that a literary work is made and is entitled to copyright
protection from the time it is first recorded or transformed on to a disk or a chip, if
that is the first material form that the work takes. It is submitted that there is no
logical distinction between a magnetic and electronic medium and that an object code
stored in a chip is a "material form" ..Gibbs, Cl, however expressed a wntrar)' view in
the Apple case and held that the object code was not a translation of the source C()(k
because the turning into electrical impulses was not "the expression ,,1' rendering of
something in another form". In the same Court both Masson and Wilson, JJ, thought
otherwise, as did Lockhart and Fox, JJ, in the Full Federal Court. Gibbs, O's, view
was therefore a minority opinion.
To sum up, it is submitted that an object code falls into the category of "literary
works" and is protected by copyright law because it satisfies the "writing" requirement
of the statute. It may be recalled that the definition of "writing" includes "any
form of lIotatioll" which the Oxford English Dictionary defines as "representing of
numbers,
quantities, pitch and duration of sound, etc., by symbols". A straightforward reading of the language of the New Zealand CopYright Act of 1962 indicates
that object code, when printed on paper or stored in a memory de.ice,
satisfies the material form criterion. Object code written out on paper may certainly
be directly perceived. Object code stored in machine-usable
media - such
as
magnetic tape, floppy disk, or ROM - can be perceived or reproduced with the aid
of a machine, because a computcr can produce a printed copy of the object code. In
the case of programs written in assembly or a high-level language, the object code
produced by an assembler or compiler is just as much an original work of the author
of the sou;ce program as is the source program itself, because object code is
essentially a mechanical translation of the source program into another language
Finally, if 'there is no copyright in the object programs which are a natural and
necessary derivative of the source programs, there is no pOint in protecting the
source program.
The majority of High Court also, however, held that the object program was not
a "translation" of the source program and hence not an "adaptation" of a literary worK
within the meaning of the statute. Adaptation means changing the work's form or
shape rather than its essence. According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, adaptation
means to modify, alter, adjust, make suitable for a purpose. In the majority's view the
programs in object code were not adaptations, i.e., translations2S of the program in
source code for the following reasons:
(i) The Act does not contain. a definition of "translation".
defines "translation" as,-

26.
27.
28

Equivalent to section 3(8) of the ;\ew Zealand Copyright Act. 1%2.
Emphasis supplied.
Section IO(I)(c)(i), Copyright A:l. 1%8 (Oh).

The shorter

OED
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"The action or process of turning from one language into another"
[described by the majority as the "primary" meaning].
"The expression or rendering of something in another medium or form"
(described by the majority as "transferred and figurative" use].
In the context of the definition of "adaptation", the primary, meaning is intended. If
that were not so, the provisions of paras (a), (b) and (c)(ii) of the definition would
appear to be surplusage. The majority argued that clearly, the programs in ROMs
were not a translation because they were not turned into another language, not even
into another computer language - they were turned into electrical impulses. Even in
the figurative and transferred sense, ROMs did not portray or represent the source
code in a different form or medium; rather they were the means of putting into action
and making effective the instructions written in source programs.29
(ii) The definition of "adaptation" in section 10(1)30"is an exhaustive one".3l
It is submitted that there is no authority for the majority's conclusion that the
"primary" meaning should be attributed to "translation". The ordinary meaning and
the sense in which computer programmers use the word32 is to "express the sense of
(word, sentence, speech, book, poem, etc) ... in or to another form of representation or
another medium or form.33 Conversion of one code to another clearly falls within this
definition: "It is submitted that such a conversion, however carried out in practice, is a
'translation' of the work within the meaning of section 2(6)(a)(iii) of the Act [of
1956]
34 Nor is the argument based on "context" persuasive. Not only the word
"language" is defined in a broad sense (language does not necessarily mean writing or
speech), thus "method of expression (finger language, talk by conventional signs with
fingers; system of symbols and rules for writing computer programs.3< Furthermore,
since para (c)(ii), which deals with pictorial version, is not covered by the so-called
"primary" meaning, why should para (c)(i) be ?
Regarding the majority's other objection, viz ROMs did not represent a source
code in a different medium but they were actually the means of putting into action the
instructions, two submissions may be made: One, what media is finally chosen for
embodiment of the program is irrelevant to the programmer. The copyrightability
entitlement does not differ merely on the basis of medium in which the program is
found. And, two, when a person converts a text into morse code (a series of dots and
dashes), could it 1:leargued that the resultant notations were really instructions to the
telegraph operator on how to send the message?
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Brennan, J, thought that the secondary meaning might make it arguable that it is a translation. But
an adaptation, according to him, had itself to be a "work".
Equivalent to section 2(1), Copyright Act, 1962 (NZ).
Note that the New Zealand provision uses the expression "includes".
This meaning is supported by the 1979 Repol1 of the United States National Commission on New
Technological Useson Copyright Works (CONTU).
Concise (Aford Dictionary p 1232.
Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria The Modem Law of Copyright, (ButtelWorths 1980) para 2.143. See
also Sega Enterprises Lid v Richards (1983) FSR 73.
Concise Oxford Dicitionar)',p. 606 .
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Must an adap~ation of a literary work itself be a literary work? Four out of the
five High Court judges (Deane, J, did not consider it necessary to decide this
question) took the view that an adaptation had itself to be a "work" in the light of
section 31(1)(a)(vii).36 It is submitted that this interpretation would lead to double
requirement. Further, the textual wording of this section does not support the view
the Apple Court took.3? In any case, as stated earlier, denial of protection to object
code would make copyright protection to source code almost redundant.
The High Court's final finding was that the object program was not a
reproduction in a material form of the same program. It is submitted that the Court
failed to address this question properly. The Chief Justice discussed it with reference
to Wombat ROMs, i.e. whether they contained reproductions of Apple's source
ROMs. He concluded that there was no reproduction. Mason and Wilson, JJ, also
looked at this question from the same perspective but reached the opposite
conclusion. Only Brennan and Deane, .TJ, addressed the question in tne correct
manner but came to the conclusion that there was no reproduction irt mat-erial form
of the written expression. Regretfully, the judges erroneously used) the expressions
"reproduction"
and "adaptation" interchangeably,
which, it is submitted,
is a
misconstruction of the statutory scheme. The lower courts did not decide this issue.
Be that as it may, the majority judges concluded that a reproduction must have a
visible similarity to the work reproduced. This conclusion was most surprising. The
judges relied heavily on Cuisellaire v. Reed38 and a few other authorities in support of
the conclusion that ROM chips were not reproductions in a material form of source
code. Cuisenaire involved a publication by the plaintiff of a book in which a new
method of teaching arithmetic was described. The method used a number of wooden
rods of varying lengths and colours, all having a uniform thickness. The book set out a
table describing the number of rods required, their respective lengths and colours.
The book did not contain any diagrams or illustrations of the rods. The plaintiff
claimed copyright in the rods. Protection was denied because the plaintiff was seeking
to protect the idea and not its expression. Another case which was cited in support of
majority's conclusion was Hollillrake v. Tn/swell. 39
It is submitted that these cases do not assist. A computer program when written
is a literary work. Its embodiment in a chip retains the form of expression of the
original work; retrieval is possible. But no part of the text of the book could be
retrieved or "read" from the rods. The assembly code was written for the purpose of
being encoded on chips - to serve as the operating instructions for the computer.
Computer programs are designed primarily to be "communications" to computers. No
other form of written text operates quite this way. This uniqueness was the essence of
the dispute as to whether copyright existed.

36.
37.
38.
39.

Equivalent to section 7(3)(g), Copyright Act, 1962 (NZ).
Note that the New Zealand provision uses a different wording. Compare section 7(3)(g) of the New
Zealand provision with its Australian counterpart section 31(1)(a)(vii).
(1963) VR 719.
(1894) Ch 420 (CA). See also above note 15.
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There seems to be running through the majority judgments the notion that a
reproduction (also true in the case of an adaptation), like the literary work itself, must
be capable of being seen or heard. Support was derived from the definition of
;'writing". In the author's view, this objection based on the specific wording of section·
19(1) "writing" is conclusively answered by section 31(1)(a)(i) "to reproduce the work
in a material form". These words clearly cover the program as embodied in the ROM
chip.40 To find otherwise would require reading words into section 31(1)(a)(i) which
are not there.
It may be argued that since the New ~ealand';, dp-finition of "writing" contains
the expression "any similar process", the principle of ejusdpl1l generis would apply. But
it should be remembered that that principle is applicable only to cut down the general
scope of a statutory provision when it is clear that the legislature did not intend a
broad one. It is submitted that the New Zealand legislature's intention in the case of
section 2(1) "writing" and section 3(8) and 7(3)(a) "some other material form" and
"any material form" (respectiveiy), is very clear. The enumerations
are used as
examples. The general wording is said to "include" the specifics. Therefore, the
principle of ejusdem gcncris can have no role to play.
There are several material differences between the New Zealand and Australian
copyright legislations. The main ones are:
(i) The definition of "writing" in the New Zealand statute is not only inclusive
but is also very broad:
"Writing" includes any form of notation,
typewriting, or any similar process.4!

whether

by hand or printing,

On the other hand, the Australian Act contains this definition:
''(W]''riting means a mode of representing or reproducing words, figures or
symbols 111 a visible form, and 'written' has a corresponding meaning42

(ii) The definition of "adaptation" under the New Zealand statute uses the
expression "includes" (implying that it is not an exhaustive
whereas the Australian statute contains the word "means',43

defmition),

(iii) Section 7(3)(a) of the New Zealand Copyright Act prohibits reproduction
of the work "in any material form,t44 whereas the Australian cognate
provision re8;ds "to reproduce the work in a material form".45 This
differe,1ce in the language influenced the Canadian Federal Court recently
to hold that object code had protection under the copyright statute.46
40.

See section 7(3) (a), Copyright Act, 1962 (NZ). Note that this provision uses the word "any" instead

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Section 2(1), Copyright Act, 1962 (NZ) (empt.asis supplied).
Section 10(1), Copyright Act, 1968 (Cth) (emphasis supplied).
See sections 2(1) and 10(1), respectively.
Emphasis supplied.
Section 31(1)(a)(i) Copyright Act, 1968 (Cth) (emphasis supplied).
tipple
C<Jnrpl4lC7' Inc v Maci/lCosh Complllers Ille, (1986) 28 DLR 178. Note that the Canadian
provision is the same as the New Zealand provision.

46.

of "a".

Copyright

ill sQjtware

45

When the present Copyright Act was originally enacted in 1962, no thought
could have been given to software protection and whether software would be covered
by the provisions of the Act. However, this may not be a relevant consideration since
the only question is whether the terms of Hie Act as drafted can fairly be said to cover
such programs encoded in the ROM chip. The legislative history of "material form''''?
may be of some assistance. The 1842 UK Copyright Act, which applied to Australia
and New Zealand, provided, '''Copyright' shall be construed to mean the sole and
exclusive liberty of printing or otherwise multiplying copies of any ... 'book"'. "Book"
was defined as including: "every volume, part or division of a volume, pamphlet, sheet
of letter press, sheet of music, map, chart of plan .. " In Boosey v. Whight,48 it was held
that perforated sheets did not breach copyright in the sheet music from which the
copies were made. The 1911 Copyright Act amended this provision thus: "Copyright
means the right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in
any material fonn whatsoever ...•9 and perforated rolls along with several other things
were expressly. mentioned. This provision has been carried forward into the
Australian and New Zealand legislation and appears in similar form in section
31(1)(a)(i) and section 7(3)(a), respectively.
It is apparent that the words of section 7(3)(a) were purposely drafted broadly
enough to encompass new technologies which had not been thought of when the Act
was drafted. It is submitted that the 1911 amendments did away with any requirement
that in order to be covered by copyright, the copy or reproduction of the work had to
be in a human readable form. Equally, the 1911 amendments did away with any rule
which would deny copyright protection to a work merely because the copy or
reproduction could be characterised as being part of a machine e.g. section 19(1) of
the 1911 Act which provided, "Copyright shall subsist in record, perforated rolls, and
other contrivances by means of which sounds may be mechanically reproduced ... "
For these reasons, it is submitted that the Apple decision would not be followed
in New Zealand and is not a barrier to granting copyright protection to object
programs in New Zealand.
The view that copyright statute should be read to require that a work be
intended to communicate an expression to humans is unsound for three reasons. First,
such an interpretation is unjustified in light of prior copyright practice. The law
reports are full of examples of works which have been copyrighted that were not
intended to communicate
any original expression, e.g. telephone
directories,
telegraphic codes. Second, both the "material form" requirement and the defmition of
"copy" require only that a work be capable of being "reproduced". In fact-an "eyereadable" version of the object code program is easily reproduced from the machine
usable. form. Moreover,
machine language is well understood
by trained
programmers.
Thirdly, the view that copyright protects only works intended to
47.
48.
49.

See section 31(1)(a)(i), Copyright Act, 1968 (Cth); section 7(3)(a), Copyright Act, 1962 (NZ).
(1899) 1 Ch. 836, affinned (1900) Ch. 122 (CA).
Emphasis supplied.
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communicate an original expression to humans wrongly forces a program to qualify
under two statutory categories of copyrightable creations in order to gain protection.
Futhermore, as pointed out earlier, this view appears to confuse the "medium" and the
"message".5(J
Copyright law provides a number of mechanisms for limiting the exclusive rights
of a copyright owner in order to ensure public access to information. One of these is
fair dealing. As noted earlier,51fair dealing is an equitable doctrine that limits the
scope of copyright when appropriate for the ultimate benefit of society. Fair dealing is
primarily a question of fact. There are several factors to be considered in determining
whether a particular dealing is fair. No single factor is determinative; all must be
weighed.52
Is the decompilation or disassembly of object form software a fair dealing?
When the purpose of the decompilation and disassembly is to gain access to the
structure and logic of the software, the answer is in the affirmative. Although the
decompilation or disassembly process may result in the formation of a copy of the
whole of the object program, it will be a fair dealing if the ultimate purpose of the
process was not to misappropriate the protected expression but rather to gain access
to the underlying ideas "hidden" in the program in order to modify or adapt the
program to a new use, or to facilitate the creation of compatible software. The fact
that the purpose of developing compatible software has a commercial motive will not
by itself. preclude a finding of fair dealing if the new work offers some benefit to the
public.
The exception of fair dealing has been held to be particularly applicable to
compilation works, e.g. data bases. In a United States' case Dvw Jones & Co. v. Board
of Trade of the City of Chicago the Court observed, "Because copyright protection for
compilations of factual material cannot be reconciled with the general principles of
the copyright laws... such works should be most conducive to fair [dealing]. Authors
of compilations, therefore, must be held to grant broader licenses for subsequent use
than persons whose work is truly creative.53
The nature of object form software is that any ideas contained in it are not
accessible without decompilation or dbassembly. The program is not like a book
whose ideas can be extracted by inspection. The only access to its ideas is through
processes that necessarily involve the creation of an unauthorised copy.
Generally stating, the fair dealing exceptions under sections 19 to 2154do not
permit copying of the entire work. Indeed, section 21 expressly provides that "no copy
shall extend to more than a reasonable proporlion of the work55and this restriction
50.
51.
52.

See above note 6.
See above paras 5-6
See Puri "Fair Dealing with Copyright Material in Australia and New Zealand" (1983) 13 VUWLR

53.

546 F Supp 113, 120 (NY 1982). See also

277.

104 S Ct n4 (1984).

54.
55.

Copyright Act, 1962 (NZ).
Emphasis supplied.
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may be a major problem for anyone copying an object form of softwan:::. Sections 19
and 20 may also be similarly construed, otherwise the reproduction of the entire work
may not be a ;"fair" dealing even for purposes of research or private study. It is
submitted that the existing legislative provisions dealing with fair dealing are
inappropriate. However it is hoped that the courts in New Zealand would interpret
these provisions differently vis-a-vis software use. The copying of a substantial portion
of the object program, and in some cases the entire work, may have to be permitted to
make full sense of fair dealing doctrine. The process of decompilation or disassembly
results in an equivalent source code version of the object form program. Although this
version is a copy of the elltire computer program, it is unavoidable that such a copy is
made in the course of "reverse engineering" object form software. It is impossible to
determine the meaning of each binary sequence in the object code version of the
program without reference to the context ih which it is executed by the computer. To
understand the context, the en lire program must be analysed. NOlhing less than
complete copying will suffice. Decompilalion and disassembly should not therefore be
condemned merely because the entire work is copied.
The alleged infringing act that occurs during decompilalion or disassembly is the
creation of an ..mauthorised copy, the equivalent source code version of the object
form software. II' considering decompilation or disassembly, the economic impact of
~he allegedly infringing article (equivalent source code version) on the market for the
object form program must be examined. The object form software is directly usabl"
on a computer while the equivalent source code version is not. Thus, the allegedi)
infringing article performs a different function from the copyrighted work. The
market for the object form program consists of computer users who need an
executable program. The "market" for the equivalent source code version consists of
competitors and users seeking to understand the structure and logic of the program.
Those wanting an executable (object) program would neither need nor want the
alleged infringer's equivalent source code version. Since the object program and the
copy perform different functions, the latter has no immediate adverse economic
impact upon the market for the former. It should however be pointed out that any
recompilation or reassembly of the equivalent source code version and sale of the
resulting object form software in competition with the original object form program
would not be a fair dealing. Nor, for that matter, would marketing of the equivalent
source code be protected under this exception. The only purpose for which a copy can
be made is to gain access to the structure and logic of the program to/permit
adaptation or correction of the program for research or private study or to, facilitate
the development of compatible programs. Absent contractual resti"ic(ions and/or
trade secrets, the reproduction of an object form of software for the purpose of
gaining access to the un copyrighted ideas in the program is fair dealing. The nature of
object form software masks these ideas and requires that the entire work be copied as
un essential step in accessing them.
The preceding paragraphs have dealt with copyright in software. However, in
many instances, it will be at least as important to protect copyright in the program's
documentation. This may include instruction manuals.and the programmer's notes on
how a program was constructed. Usually a detailed set of instructions accompany the
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software package. Instruction manuals are not outside the scope of copyright
protection. Copyright might not protect c.•'cry minor direction for use of a machine or
device, but an instruction manual contains a set of complex and precise instructions
for the user, To reproduce in a material form (i.e. to make a photocopy) or to adapt
the actual written instructions plainly involves infringement of the copyright in the
"literary" work. It is most unlikely that a reproduction of an instruction manual would
satisfy the requirements of fair dealing.
As seen above, there are several legal approaches to protecting software, and
they may in many situations bc combined for maximum results. Usually when an
object form of software is sold, a combination strategy of contract law and copyright
law is used. A contract is simply a legally enforceable agreement that stat~s the
parties' rights and responsibilities. Usually a contract prohibits the customer from
using the software in an unauthoriscd manner or lending it to third parties. However,
the major weakness of a contract as a protection method is that it is binding only on
those who are parties to it. In contrast, it is one of the features of copyright that it
provides protection in the absence of any !egal relationship, whether express or
implied. Personal computers are nowadays owned and operated by fairly substantial
business houses, academic instit utions, official organ~ations and the like. It is a
common practice for suppliers of software to seek legal protection not only under the
copyright law but also by using the law of contract. The following is an (edited)
example of one such contract:
MICROSOfT

LICENCE AGREEMENT

Carefully read all the terms and conditions of this agreement prior to
breaICing the diskette seal. Breaking the diskette seal indicates your
acceptance of these terms and conditions.
1.

LICENCE: You have the non-exclusive right to use the enclosed program.
This program can only be used on a single computer. You may physically
transfer the program from one computer to another provided that the
program is useo on only one computer at a time. You may not
electronically transfer the program from one computer to another over a
network. You may not distribute copies of the program or documentation
to others. You may not modify or translate the program or related
documentation without the prior written consent of Microsoft.
YOU MAY NOT USE, COPY, MODIFY,
OR TRANSFf:R
UllE
PROGRAM OR DOCUMENTATION,
OR ANY COPY EXCEPT AS
EXPRESSLY PROVIDED IN THIS AGREEMENT.

2.

BACK-UP AND TRANSFER:
You may make one (1) copy of the
program solely for back-up purposes. You must reproduce and include the

copyright notice on the back-up copy. You may transfer and .Iicense the
product

to another

party if the other

party agrees

to the terms

and
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conditions of this Agreement and completes and returns a Registration
Card to Microsoft If you transfer the program you must at the same time
transfer
the documentation
and back-up
copy or transfer
the
documentation and destroy the back-up copy.
3.

COPYRIGHT:
The program
and its related
documentation
are
copyrighted. You may not copy the program or its documentation except as
for back-up purposes and to load the program into the computer as part of
executing the program. All other copies of the program
and its
documentation are in violation of this Agreement.

4.

TERM: This licence is effective until terminated. YQU may terminate it by
destroying the program and documentation and all copies thereof. This
lic.ence will also terminate if you fail to comply with any term or condition
of this Agreement. You agree on such termination to destroy all copies of
tbe program and documentation.

Appendix
GLOSSARY OF COMPUTER JARGON
1. "APPLICATION" PROGRAM
AND "OPERATING"
PROGRAM:

2.

•

Although, in one sense, all programs instruct the
computer, they are frequently categorised by the
function they perform.
Operating
programs
are
programs that, as a system, instruct the computer to
manage
its own resources,
execute
application
programs and manage data. Application programs are
designed for a specific task, such as the playing of a
video game, preparation
of a tax return, or, in
business, to calculate the payroll or the accounts
receivable. Operating programs are usually supplied by
hardware
manufacturers,
whereas
application
programs can be bought "off-the-rack", or can be
"tailor-made" to suit the user's needs. N.B. In App/e the
programs
answered the description
of operating
programs.

ASSEMBLY LANGUAGE
OR SOURCE CODE:

A second level of language (also referred to as
intermediate
level) consists of mnemonics
(each
comprising three letters of the alphabet, e.g., LDY,
which stands for "Load index Y with memory") which
correspond more explicitly to the operations
the
computer must perform. It is a language which is
directed to a human reader and not to a machine. It
can be readily understood

by persons skilled in its use.

Natiollal Law School JOllmal

50

Assembly language (or code) is converted into
machine language by using a computer program called
"assembler". This conversion from source to object
code consists of a series of electrical-impulses
which
can be stored on a magnetic tape or disk or
permanently
installed on a ROM. A ROM is
embodied in silicon chip.
3.

BINARY NOTATION:

Binary notation
and hexadecimal
notation
are
conventional ways of representing in writing an object
program. Binary notation is based on a number system
having a base two. A microprocessor cannot store or
operate in accordance with a program expressed in
source code. As an electrical device it can only register
the presence or absence of electrical impulses and
perform all it~ functions according to a process which
can be described in~terms of binary arithmetic. An "0"
(zero) indicates the presence of an electric current, or
impulse, at a particular jlace, and a "1" (one) indicates
the lack of a current, or an electric impulse. The digits
o and 1 are called binary digits or "bits", and represent
the only unit of information that can be recognised by
a computer, namely, the- presence or absence of
electric current. In fact, it is the binary form of
machine language which the computer "understands".

4.

HEXADECIMAL SYSTEM:

Hexadecimal notation is based on a number system
having a base sixteen. This system is merely a shorthand way of writing the binary code. It is used because
it uses less characters and is therefore less cumbersome
than binary. The assembly language (source code) can
be converted into machine language (object code) in
its binary or hexadecimal code by means of a computer
program called "assembler". The conversion can be
done manually but the process is very tedious. The
program can be originally written in hexadecimal code,
rather than in assembly language, except for the
cumbersomeness and tediousness of doing so.

5.

BIT AND BYTE:

Each digit of binary code (be it a "0" or "1") is called a
"bit". A string of eight digits is called a "byte". A byte is
a basic unit of measure of a computer's memory.

6.

COMPUTER LANGUAGE:

A code for writing a program.

7.

COMPUTER PROGRAM:

A computer program is a concise series of instructions
that directs the computer to do the tasks required of it
step by step and to produce the desired result.
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8.

HARDWARE:

The machines in a computer system are called its
"hardw;tre".The computer and all the physical devices
attached to it (e.g. microprocessor, keyboard, disk
drive unit, monitor, printer) are compendiously
described as hardware.

9.

HIGH LEVEL lANGUAGE:

A high level language has symbols and rules that
correspond closely enough to ordinary mathematics
and Engiish( or other common language) that it may
be read and understood with relative ease. Examples
are languages such as BASIC, COBOL, PASCAL and
FORTRAN. Whichever type of high level language is
used by the programer, a "translator" is needed to
translate the symbolic statements in that language into
machine language. In performing the function the
translator is called a "compiler" N.B. BASIC cannot be
converted into machine language or object code.

10.

INPUT DEVICES:

11.

MACHINE lANGUAGE
OR ODJECT CODE:

12.

The keyboard and disk drive unit are referred to as
"input" devices.
A low level language which has two versions: a system
of binary notation and a system of hexadecimal
notation. Either notation is a description of the object
code program and is intelligihle to persons trained in
the use of that form of notation. Object code is
machine language, i.e. language which can be
understood by the microprocessor in the computer.
Object code can be written.

MICROPROCESSOR
OR CENTRAL PROCESSING Ur-;IT (CPU):

The CPU is the operating centre of every computer.
All the manipulation of information entering a
computer system takes place in its CPU. The CPU
controls the operation of the entire system by fetching
instructions and data from the memory and processing
the data in accordance with the instructions. For
example, when the computer system is used for the
retrieval of legal information - a form of data
processing - the CPU is where all the sorting and
rearranging takes place. The CPU is a complex and
extensive set of electrical circuitry. As such, it knows
only the presence or absence of electrical impulses.
The semiconductors in the microprocessor can be in
one of two possible states, similar to that of an electric
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light globe, namely either "on" or "of'. This two-state
system (known as a binary system) is represented by
the digits 0 or 1.
13.

ROM (READ-ONLY
MEMORY):

Some programs can be stored permanently in il
memory device, the essence of which is a silicon chip.
These are 3ttached inside the computer at the time of
manufacture, although they are readily removable and
can be replaced. Their "memory" is not erased when
the computer is switched off. They cannot be altered,
and are therefore sometimes called "firmware". ROMs
typically
store
operating
programs
for
the
microcomputer, as these programs arc always required
whenever the complllcr is being used. ROMs initialise
the computer and lets a person to use it. ROMs hold
important progr<lms or data which is available to the
computer when the power is first turned on.

14.

EPROM (ERASAI3LE
PROGRAMMAI3LE READ- A program
stored in an EPROM
is embodied
ONLY MEMORY):
therein as a pattern of electronic charges stored on

insulated "floating gates" (referred
to as "MaS"
technology). The absence of an electronic impulse is
indicated by an uncharged gate. If an EPROM is
illuminated through a "window" in its outer surface by
ultraviolet light the pattern will be erased, otherwise it
remains. An EPROM, unlike a ROM, is a variable
memory device.
15.

RAM (RANDOM
ACCESS MEMORY):

Storage on memory chips, in which data and programs
can be written in and read from any main storage
location readily and speedily, are called RAMs. All
RAMs share the feature of being volatile, that is, they
require a continuous supply of electric current to
maintain. the stored data. If the current is stopped, or
even interrupted,
all the data represented
in the
memory is lost.

16.

SOPTWARE:

Programs
which
do not
form
part
of tht,
microprocessor
itself (e.g. magnetic disks, ROM,
RAM, EPROM).

17.

SlLIC01\; CHIPS:

A silicon chip is made up of thousands of int~grated,
complete electronic circuits etched onto a small chip of
silicon. The chip contains numerous fusible connectors
and insulated capacitors. Using a device referred to as
a "ROM Burner". the impulses are passed through the
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chips, burning out· the. connectors and leaving the
capacitors electrically charged. The pattern of
connectors and capacitors thus affected correspond to
the sequence of electrical impulses so that the same
sequence of electrical impulses can be regenerated.
The impulses are regenerated in this way each time
the program is used or "run" in the 'microprocessor.
The patterns can be seen, but only with an electroAic
mIcroscope.

* * * *

